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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
Ricardo Mitchell appeals his conviction on charges 
related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial 
number.  We consider whether the “close cousin” of the 
prosecutor and an employee of the police department who 
worked with Government witnesses should have been 
disqualified as jurors in Mitchell’s trial pursuant to the 
doctrine of implied bias.  The law, we conclude, presumes 
. 
3 
 
bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case.  
Because the District Court did not elicit sufficient information 
on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and 
Juror 28, his cousin, we will remand for additional 
factfinding.  However, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, the police 
department employee, because the law does not categorically 
impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial. 
 
I. 
 
Mitchell was arrested on September 27, 2010 after an 
encounter with police officers.  While on patrol that evening, 
Officers Joseph Brown and Bruce Taylor detected the smell 
of marijuana near where Mitchell was leaning into a car 
window.  Planning to conduct a field interview, Officer 
Brown exited his squad car and approached Mitchell, who 
started to backpedal and fumble for something in his 
waistband.  Worried that it was a gun, Officer Brown ran and 
tackled him.  An object clattered to the ground as the men fell 
to the street.  After Officer Brown handcuffed Mitchell, he 
discovered a loaded magazine underneath Mitchell’s body 
and a loaded semiautomatic handgun nearby.  The serial 
number on the gun had been filed down and was 
undecipherable.  In response to questioning by Officer 
Taylor, Mitchell later admitted that he did not have a license 
to possess a weapon.   
 
The grand jury returned a three-count indictment 
charging Mitchell with possession of a firearm with an 
obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) 
(Count 1) and V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 481(a) and (b) (Count 
3), and possession of an unlicensed firearm, in violation of 
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V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a) (Count 2).  The District 
Court held a two-day trial.  During voir dire, the District 
Judge asked the jury venire if anyone was related by blood, 
business, or marriage to the prosecutor.  Juror 28 raised her 
hand, leading to the following colloquy: 
 
 Juror 28: He’s my blood relative. 
 
 The Court: How is he related to you? 
 
 Juror 28:  By father side. 
 
 The Court: What is his relation to you? 
 
 Juror 28: Cousin. 
 
The Court: All right.  Is there anything in that 
relationship that would — are you a 
close cousin or a distant cousin?  
 
Juror 28: Close.  But I don’t think that have 
anything to do with it. 
 
The Court: All right.  Is there anything in that 
relationship that would prevent you from 
following my instructions on the law? 
 
Juror 28: No, Your Honor. 
 
The Court: Is there anything in that relationship that 
would prevent you from listening to the 
evidence in this case fairly and 
impartially? 
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Juror 28: No, Your Honor. 
 
The Court: All right.  Thank you. 
 
Appendix (“App.”) 20-21.  Neither party sought to ask Juror 
28 additional questions, and neither party challenged her for 
cause or used a peremptory strike on her.   
 
Subsequently, the District Judge read the parties’ 
witness lists and asked if any venireperson had a relationship 
by blood, marriage, or business to those individuals.  Juror 97 
responded affirmatively: 
 
Juror 97: I work for the V.I. Police Department, so 
I’m familiar with Officer Lans and 
Officer Taylor.  I’m their coworker. 
 
The Court: All right.  Do you work with them daily? 
 
Juror 97: I work in the fiscal and property, so I 
issue supplies and stuff, uniform. 
 
The Court: All right.  You not in the field or 
anything with these — 
 
Juror 97: No. 
 
The Court: All right.  Is there anything in your 
relationship with these two individuals 
that would prevent you from following 
my instructions on the law? 
 
Juror 97: No. 
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The Court:   Is there anything in your relationship 
with those individuals that would prevent 
you from listening to the evidence in this 
case fairly and impartially? 
 
Juror 97: No. 
 
App. 24-25.  Again, neither party posed additional questions 
to Juror 97, challenged her for cause, or used a peremptory 
strike on her.   
 
Jurors 28 and 97 were seated as members of the jury.  
Later that evening, Mitchell filed a motion to strike Juror 97 
for cause.  He argued that she could not remain impartial 
because she was a coworker of key witnesses in the case and 
would feel pressured to vote in the interests of her employer, 
the police department.  The District Court denied the motion.  
The jury found Mitchell guilty on all counts, and the District 
Court sentenced him to a 15-year term of imprisonment on 
Count 3 and one-year terms of imprisonment on both Counts 
1 and 2, to be served concurrently with Count 3.  Mitchell 
filed this timely appeal to challenge the presence of Jurors 28 
and 97 on his jury.1
 
  
II. 
 
A. 
 
                                              
1 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal 
defendant “the right to a . . . trial[] by an impartial jury.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI.  Complementing this right are the 
protections afforded by the Due Process Clause, which have 
“long demanded that, if a jury is to be provided the defendant, 
regardless of whether the Sixth Amendment requires it, the 
jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent 
commanded by the Sixth Amendment.”  Morgan v. Illinois, 
504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992).  Voir dire examination serves to 
protect the right to an impartial jury by providing the parties a 
means of uncovering juror bias.  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1994); Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-
30; Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991).  Bias that 
emerges in response to voir dire questioning can lead to 
excusal of a juror for cause or may facilitate the parties’ 
intelligent exercise of peremptory strikes.  McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood
 
, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984). 
Traditionally, courts have distinguished between two 
types of challenges for cause:  those based on actual bias, and 
those based on implied bias.  E.g., Dennis v. United States, 
339 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1950); United States v. Wood, 299 
U.S. 123, 133 (1936); United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 
1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 
38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997).  Actual bias, also known as bias in fact, 
is “the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference 
that the person will not act with entire impartiality.”  Torres, 
128 F.3d at 43.  All members of the venire are subject to 
examination for actual bias, which may become apparent 
when a venireperson admits partiality or may be inferred from 
responses to voir dire questioning.  Wood, 299 U.S. at 133-
34; Torres, 128 F.3d at 43.  District courts possess broad 
discretion in excusing prospective jurors for cause on the 
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basis of actual bias.  Dennis, 339 U.S. at 168.  We defer to 
rulings of the district court on actual bias because it possesses 
a superior capacity to observe the demeanor of prospective 
jurors and to assess their credibility.  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412, 428 (1985); Torres
 
, 128 F.3d at 44. 
Implied bias, by contrast, is “bias conclusively 
presumed as [a] matter of law,” or, put another way, “bias 
attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual 
partiality.”  Wood, 299 U.S. at 133, 134.  This doctrine is 
rooted in the recognition that certain narrowly-drawn classes 
of jurors are highly unlikely, on average, to be able to render 
impartial jury service despite their assurances to the contrary.  
E.g., Dennis, 339 U.S. at 175 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988).2
                                              
2 Discussing implied bias under the pre-Erie authority of 
general common law, the Supreme Court offered an apt 
summary of the rationale for the doctrine: 
  For 
 
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of 
the mind that it is most difficult, if not 
impossible, to always recognize its existence, 
and it might exist in the mind of one (on 
account of his relations with one of the parties) 
who was quite positive that he had no bias, and 
said that he was perfectly able to decide the 
question wholly uninfluenced by anything but 
the evidence.  The law therefore most wisely 
says that, with regard to some of the relations 
which may exist between the juror and one of 
the parties, bias is implied, and evidence of its 
actual existence need not be given. 
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example, the victim of a crime might insist that she can serve 
as an impartial juror in her assailant’s trial.  But, 
understanding that the average person in her situation likely 
would harbor prejudice, consciously or unconsciously, the 
law imputes bias to her categorically and mandates her 
excusal for cause.  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Greer
 
, 
285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002).   
Because implied bias deals in categories prescribed by 
law, the question whether a juror’s bias may be implied is a 
legal question, not a matter of discretion for the trial court.  
Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 n.* (O’Connor, J., concurring); Burton 
v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1991).  The 
test focuses on “whether an average person in the position of 
the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.”  Torres, 128 
F.3d at 45; accord Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151; United States 
v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Duncan, 242 
F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 2001).  Courts look to the facts 
underlying the alleged bias to determine if they would create 
in a juror an inherent risk of substantial emotional 
involvement.  United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 641-
42 (6th Cir. 2010); Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 399 (5th 
Cir. 2003).  A prospective juror’s assessment of her own 
ability to remain impartial is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
test.  Torres, 128 F.3d at 45.  Because the right to an impartial 
jury is constitutive of the right to a fair trial, “[d]oubts 
regarding bias must be resolved against the juror.”  United 
States v. Gonzalez
                                                                                                     
 
, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) 
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).   
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(quoting Burton, 948 F.2d at 1158); see also United States v. 
Polichemi
 
, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
a juror who belongs to a class presumed biased “may well be 
objective in fact, but the relationship is so close that the law 
errs on the side of caution”). 
B. 
 
The most oft-discussed precedent of recent vintage 
addressing implied bias is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).  The case involved a 
juror in a criminal trial who submitted a job application to the 
District Attorney’s office while trial was ongoing.  Id. at 212.  
The prosecutors chose not to mention the development to 
defense counsel or to the judge until weeks after the jury 
returned a guilty verdict.  Id. at 212-13.  The trial court held a 
hearing on the matter and concluded that the indiscretion did 
not prejudice the outcome of the case.  Id. at 213-14.  
Reviewing a subsequent habeas petition, the United States 
District Court found insufficient evidence that the juror was 
actually biased, but nevertheless ordered the defendant’s 
release or retrial on the basis of implied bias.  Id. at 214.  
Because the average person in the juror’s position would 
expect his vote for guilt or acquittal to affect his job 
application, the District Court reasoned, the law must impute 
bias to the juror.  Id.
 
   
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 
but the Supreme Court reversed, finding there was an 
insufficient basis for a due process violation.  Id. at 214, 217-
18.  The Court explained that “the remedy for allegations of 
juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the 
opportunity to prove actual bias.”  Id. at 215.  And it 
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concluded that the post-verdict hearing held by the trial court 
was sufficient for this purpose because “due process does not 
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a 
potentially compromising situation.”  Id.
 
 at 217.   
Justice O’Connor joined the majority, but concurred 
separately to express her conviction that the opinion did not 
disturb the implied bias doctrine.  455 U.S. at 221 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  In most cases of juror bias, she explained, a 
post-conviction hearing will ferret out actual bias.  Id. at 222.  
But “in certain instances a hearing may be inadequate for 
uncovering a juror’s biases[.]”  Id.
 
  Those “extreme 
situations” able to “justify a finding of implied bias” include 
a revelation that the juror is an actual employee 
of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a 
close relative of one of the participants in the 
trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror 
was a witness or somehow involved in the 
criminal transaction. 
 
Id.3  In these rare circumstances, Justice O’Connor reasoned, 
“the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury should not 
allow a verdict to stand[.]”  Id.
                                              
3 Justice O’Connor also cited with approval Leonard v. 
United States, 378 U.S. 544, 545 (1964) (per curiam), which 
accepted the Government’s position that individuals who 
heard the defendant’s guilty verdict announced in a previous 
case should have been “automatically disqualified from 
serving [as jurors] at [his] second trial, if the objection [wa]s 
raised at the outset.”   
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 In the wake of Smith, some Courts of Appeals 
questioned whether the majority opinion quietly discarded the 
doctrine of implied bias.  E.g., Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 
318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he implied-bias doctrine may 
not even be viable after Smith.”); Conner v. Polk, 407 F.3d 
198, 206 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005) (“There may be some question as 
to whether implied bias remains a viable doctrine following 
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Smith[.]”); Williams 
v. Griswald, 743 F.2d 1533, 1538 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(observing that the majority in Smith “declined to use the 
urged ‘implied bias’ test”).  Our Court thrice declined to 
decide whether implied bias survived Smith.  See United 
States v. Skelton, 893 F.2d 40, 46 (3d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1225 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Ferri
 
, 778 F.2d 985, 993 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Today, however, most Courts of Appeals endorse the 
view that the implied bias doctrine retains its vitality after 
Smith.  See Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 437 (6th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753-54 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 586-87 & nn. 21, 
22 (4th Cir. 2006); Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 
1998) (en banc); Torres, 128 F.3d at 45-46; Amirault v. Fair, 
968 F.2d 1404, 1406 (1st Cir. 1992); Burton, 948 F.2d at 
1158-59; Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 
1988).  Merely two years after the decision, they point out, 
five justices joined opinions in McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 558, that 
reinforced the viability of the doctrine.  See Conaway, 453 
F.3d at 587; Solis, 342 F.3d at 395 n.6; Dyer, 151 F.3d at 985.  
Nor, they reason, would the Supreme Court abandon a 
centuries-old doctrine sub silentio.  E.g., Conaway, 453 F.3d 
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at 586-87; Brooks, 444 F.3d at 329-30 & n.5; Dyer, 151 F.3d 
at 984-85; see also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (“Th[e] Court does not normally 
overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub 
silentio.”).4  Our Court signaled agreement, observing in 
United States v. Calabrese that Smith
 
 did not foreclose the 
applicability of implied bias.  942 F.2d 218, 224 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1991).   
For the reasons well developed by our sister Courts of 
Appeals, today we confirm what Calabrese suggested in dicta:  
implied bias remains available, in appropriate circumstances, 
to disqualify jurors whose connection with the litigation 
makes it highly unlikely that they can remain impartial 
adjudicators.  Moreover, we do not find lurking in Smith a 
renunciation of implied bias.  The District Court in Smith
                                              
4 Blackstone’s Commentaries discuss a challenge for 
“principal cause,” the common law analogue of an implied 
bias challenge that “carries with it prima facie evident marks 
of suspicion, either of malice or favor” and “which, if true, 
cannot be overruled.”  William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries 
*363; see also Wood, 299 U.S. at 138 (citing Blackstone with 
approval); Crawford, 212 U.S. at 196 (same).   
 
anchored its holding in implied bias, but the Supreme Court 
majority never considered the question of whether a juror 
who applies to work with the prosecutor mid-trial falls within 
an implied bias category.  By finding the post-verdict hearing 
adequate to protect the defendant’s rights, the majority 
implicitly answered in the negative.  Justice O’Connor agreed 
and saw no tension between her concurrence and the 
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majority.5
 
  The case was not one where implied bias was 
apparent on appeal, and in light of comprehensive record 
developed in the post-verdict hearing, the Justices had no 
basis for expecting that additional fact-finding would assist in 
determining whether the law imputed bias to the juror.  
III. 
 
Having concluded that the implied bias doctrine 
survived Smith
 
, we turn to consider Mitchell’s challenges to 
Jurors 28 and 97. 
A. 
 
Mitchell contends that the District Court should have 
excused for cause Juror 28, the close cousin of the prosecutor, 
because she falls within a category of individuals to whom 
the law categorically imputes bias.  Because Mitchell did not 
object to Juror 28’s empanelment, his challenge is subject to 
plain error review.  Salamone, 800 F.2d at 1222.  To show 
plain error, Mitchell must demonstrate (1) that an error 
occurred; (2) the error was clear or obvious under current 
law; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights by 
influencing the outcome of the District Court proceedings.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
732-34 (1993); United States v. Tann
                                              
5 This accords with the common law, which never hinted that 
a juror applying to work for the prosecuting agency — as 
opposed to a juror actually employed by the prosecuting 
agency — is presumptively biased.  See, e.g., Blackstone, 3 
Commentaries *363 (listing categories of jurors presumed 
biased as a matter of law). 
, 577 F.3d 533, 537-38 
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(3d Cir. 2009).  Even if all three elements of the test are met, 
the error may be corrected only when it “‘seriously affect[s] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation’” of the 
proceedings.  Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (quoting United States 
v. Young
 
, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 
It is well settled that the Sixth Amendment, like the 
common law, under some circumstances presumes bias when 
the relative of a party in a case serves on his or her jury in a 
criminal trial.  E.g., Wood, 299 U.S. at 138, 146-47; 
Brazelton, 557 F.3d at 753; Dyer, 151 F.3d at 982; Torres, 
128 F.3d at 45.6  Indeed, consanguinity is the classic example 
of implied bias.  Conaway, 453 F.3d at 586.  Presiding over 
Aaron Burr’s trial for treason while riding circuit, Chief 
Justice Marshall explained that “the most distant relative of a 
party cannot serve upon his jury [because] . . . the law 
suspects the relative of partiality; suspects his mind to be 
under a bias, which will prevent his fairly hearing and fairly 
deciding on the testimony which may be offered to him.”  
United States v. Burr
                                              
6 We refer throughout to the relationship between a juror and 
a “party” in a case.  Of course, in a criminal case such as this, 
the United States is the party in interest, and the United States 
Attorney’s Office represents the United States.  But it is also 
true that the prosecutor is the “representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty.”  Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  For the purposes of 
this case, we will continue to employ the term “party” to refer 
to both the party in interest and its embodiment in the person 
of the prosecutor. 
, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 
14,692g).  To secure an impartial jury, he continued, “the law 
cautiously incapacitates [the juror] from serving on the jury . . 
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. because in general persons in a similar situation would feel 
prejudice.”  Id.  This is true even if “[t]he relationship [is] 
remote; the person . . . ha[s] [never] seen the party; [and] he . 
. . declare[s] that he feels no prejudice in the case[.]”  
 
Id. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s “kinship category” of implied 
bias endures.  Nearly two centuries later, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence included “close relative[s]” as one of the 
“extreme” situations where courts impute bias to a juror 
irrespective of actual partiality.  Smith
 
, 455 U.S. at 222 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  And the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reiterated the rule:  
Of course, a juror could be a witness or even a 
victim of the crime, perhaps a relative of one of 
the lawyers or the judge, and still be perfectly 
fair and objective.  Yet we would be quite 
troubled if one of the jurors turned out to be the 
prosecutor’s brother because it is highly 
unlikely that an individual will remain impartial 
and objective when a blood relative has a stake 
in the outcome.  Even if the putative juror 
swears up and down that it will not affect his 
judgment, we presume conclusively that he will 
not leave his kinship at the jury room door. 
 
Dyer, 151 F.3d at 982; see also United States v. Quinones, 
511 F.3d 289, 302 (2d Cir. 2007) (commenting that 
“[i]rrevocable bias would be so evident” from a juror’s 
admission “that he was the defendant’s brother or the 
prosecutor’s uncle” that any further inquiry into the “the 
juror’s ability to follow legal instructions and to serve 
impartially” would be “superfluous”). 
17 
 
Likely because it is so uncommon for a relative of a 
party to be seated as a juror, little case law explores the outer 
boundary of the kinship category.  Chief Justice Marshall’s 
formulation suggests that even distant relatives are 
categorically presumed biased.  Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50.  The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals likewise finds implied bias 
whenever a juror shares “any degree of kinship with a 
principal in a case.”  Brazelton, 557 F.3d at 754.  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals uses an intermediate standard, 
explaining that “automatically presumed bias deals mainly 
with jurors who are related to the parties.”  Torres, 128 F.3d 
at 45 (emphasis added).  Justice O’Connor’s formulation in 
Smith is narrower still; it presumes bias only in the case of a 
“close relative.”  Smith
 
, 455 U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).   
Our Court has not considered the parameters of the 
kinship category.  The touchstone of the inquiry, as 
previously discussed, is whether the average person in the 
position of the juror would be prejudiced and feel substantial 
emotional involvement in the case.  In view of that inquiry, 
we reject the most expansive formulations that categorically 
presume bias whenever a juror shares any degree of kinship 
with a party in a case.  A distant relative, on average, is 
unlikely to harbor the sort of prejudice that interferes with the 
impartial discharge of juror service.  On the other hand, the 
bond between close relatives is intimate enough, on average, 
to generate a stronger likelihood of prejudice, whether 
unconscious or intentionally concealed.  Compare Conaway, 
453 F.3d at 586-88 (presuming bias when it was discovered 
that a juror was the double first cousin of a key prosecution 
witness), and Brazelton, 557 F.3d at 754 (suggesting, without 
explicitly holding, that it “might seem prudent” to disqualify 
18 
 
a victim’s second cousin from juror service), with Allen v. 
Brown Clinic, P.L.L.P., 531 F.3d 568, 572-73 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting an implied bias challenge to a juror whose first 
cousin was married to the brother-in-law of the defendant).  
These considerations lead us to agree with Justice O’Connor 
that the kinship category of implied bias excludes jurors who 
are “close relative[s]” of a principal in a case.  Smith, 455 
U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  This formulation, we 
believe, is most faithful to the notion that implied bias is a 
limited doctrine, one reserved for exceptional circumstances.  
See id.; United States v. Tucker, 243 F.3d 499, 509 (8th Cir. 
2001); Gonzales v. Thomas
 
, 99 F.3d 978, 987 (10th Cir. 
1996).   
In adopting the “close relative” standard, we are 
concerned both with the right of the defendant to an impartial 
jury and with preservation of the appearance of justice in the 
courts.  See Dyer, 151 F.3d at 983.  If the seating of a party’s 
relative as a juror would lodge serious doubts in the public’s 
mind about the neutrality of the proceedings, that 
consideration favors legal attribution of bias.  Public 
confidence in the fairness of the proceedings would suffer if a 
trial court permitted a juror to deliberate and pass judgment in 
a case in which her close relative labored as prosecutor to 
procure a conviction or faced years in prison and the moral 
and societal condemnation that accompanies a criminal 
conviction.  We cannot say the same for distant relatives, 
whose relationship is sufficiently attenuated so as not to 
undermine the appearance of fairness in judicial proceedings.7
                                              
7 We note that this approach recognizes the difficulty inherent 
in seating a jury in a small community where distant family 
members may share ties with trial participants.  A per se rule 
   
19 
 
In this case we have only a bare-bones description of 
Juror 28’s relationship to the prosecutor.  Juror 28 stated that 
she was the prosecutor’s close cousin.  Neither the District 
Court nor the attorneys clarified the degree of kinship the two 
shared.  Perhaps Juror 28 was the prosecutor’s first cousin, 
but it is also possible that she was a more distant cousin who 
happened to share a close personal relationship with the 
prosecutor.  The abbreviated voir dire questioning leaves a 
notable gap in the record and hinders our review of Mitchell’s 
implied bias claim.   
 
Rather than attempt to divine from the record whether 
Juror 28 and the prosecutor are close relatives, the more 
prudent path is to remand this matter to the District Court for 
a brief evidentiary hearing.  As we have said, Smith held that 
a post-verdict hearing to probe a compromised juror for actual 
bias satisfies due process when there is no basis for finding 
implied bias.  See
 
 455 U.S. at 217.  The majority was 
convinced that a post-verdict hearing is preferable to retrial.  
It follows that, when confronting a colorable claim of implied 
juror bias on appeal, a reviewing court can remand for an 
evidentiary hearing to develop key facts necessary to decide 
the claim.   
We leave for the District Court to consider, in the first 
instance, the specific contours of the kinship category within 
the context of this case.  If on remand the District Court 
determines that Juror 28 was a close relative of the 
prosecutor, then the failure to excuse her offended Mitchell’s 
                                                                                                     
eliminating any relative, no matter how distant, could unduly 
hamper the jury selection process in such areas. 
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right to trial by an impartial jury.8  That error, clear and 
obvious under existing case law, must be remedied by retrial.  
This is so because the denial of the defendant’s right to an 
impartial adjudicator, “‘be it judge or jury,’” is a structural 
defect in the trial.  Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 
(1989) (quoting Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 
(1987)); see also Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 331 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the presence of a biased juror in the 
sentencing phase of a capital case is a structural defect 
requiring resentencing despite the defendant’s failure to 
object); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 458, 463 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973 n.2; Johnson v. 
Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1992).  And, we 
have held, errors classified as structural defects are 
“coextensive” with errors presumed prejudicial on plain error 
review.  United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 153 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citing United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 285 & 
n.6 (3d Cir. 2001)).9
                                              
8 It bears repeating that if Juror 28 was the prosecutor’s close 
relative, her guarantee that she could remain impartial is 
immaterial, for implied bias is “bias attributable in law to the 
prospective juror regardless of actual partiality.”  Wood, 299 
U.S. at 133, 134.  In arguing that Juror 28’s assurances of 
impartiality shield her from disqualification, the Government 
conflates implied bias and actual bias. 
 
 
9 One might be concerned that by presuming prejudice even 
when a juror reveals information at voir dire that puts the 
defendant on notice of an implied bias challenge, the law 
creates a perverse incentive for the defendant to avoid 
objecting in order to bolster a potential implied bias claim on 
appeal.  This type of tactical maneuvering is obviously 
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* * * * * 
 
 Because Mitchell has raised a colorable claim of 
implied bias, we will remand for additional factfinding on 
Juror 28’s degree of kinship with the prosecutor.  If Juror 28 
falls within the “close relative” category of implied bias, the 
District Court must order retrial to satisfy Mitchell’s right to 
trial by an impartial jury. 
 
B. 
 
 Mitchell’s second claim is that the District Court erred 
in denying his motion to strike Juror 97 because she, too, 
should have been presumed biased.10  We review for abuse of 
discretion the denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause.  
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 955 (9th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201 (2d Cir. 2002).  
However, a “district court by definition abuses its discretion 
when it makes an error of law,” Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 100 (1996), and implied bias is a question of law.  
Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 n.* (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
                                                                                                     
discouraged.  We expect, however, that in the vast majority of 
cases, a prospective juror’s admission that she is a close 
relative of a party will immediately alert the District Court 
that the juror should be excused for cause.  See Hughes, 258 
F.3d at 464 (“[T]he presiding trial judge has the authority and 
responsibility, either sua sponte or upon counsel’s motion, to 
dismiss prospective jurors for cause.” (citing Torres, 128 F.3d 
at 43)). 
United 
 
10 Mitchell concedes that the record does not support a 
challenge to Juror 97 on the basis of actual bias. 
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States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2000).  We 
review questions of law de novo.  United States v. Bansal
 
, 
663 F.3d 634, 657 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Juror 97 testified at voir dire that she worked with two 
of the Government’s witnesses, both police officers, at the 
Virgin Islands Police Department.11
 
  Her duties, she reported, 
included issuing equipment and uniforms to police officers, 
but did not involve work as a field agent.  The record is 
devoid of information about the nature and regularity of her 
interaction with the officers.   
Mitchell argues that Juror 97 is an employee of the 
prosecuting agency and therefore falls within a category of 
implied bias listed in the Smith concurrence.  See 455 U.S. at 
222 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Factually, he is incorrect.  
Juror 97 is not an employee of the prosecuting agency, but 
rather works for the Virgin Islands Police Department, the 
investigating agency.  Mitchell concedes that employment at 
a police department, standing alone, does not justify an 
implication of bias.  See Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171-72 
(declining, in the trial of a Communist Party official, to 
impute bias to jurors who were employees of the federal 
government and had taken an oath of loyalty to the United 
States as a condition of employment); Polichemi
                                              
11 One officer was present at Mitchell’s arrest.  The other 
arrived later to conduct the forensic investigation. 
, 219 F.3d at 
704 (“[G]overnment employment alone is not, and should not 
be, enough to trigger the rule under which an employee is 
disqualified from serving as a juror in a case involving her 
employer.”).   
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At oral argument, Mitchell pressed the more nuanced 
view that Juror 97’s employment at the police department and 
her employment interactions with the officers together supply 
a sufficient basis for legal attribution of bias.  He identifies no 
controlling precedent that presumes bias in a juror who 
works, possibly on a daily basis, for the Government with key 
witnesses in a case.  To the contrary, we have observed that 
“at common law certain relations between jurors and others 
resulted in a legal conclusion of partiality, [but] the 
relationship of a juror to a witness was not among them.”  
Gov’t of V.I. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 934 (3d Cir. 1974), 
abrogated on other grounds, Corley v. United States
 
, 556 U.S. 
303 (2009). 
To the extent that Mitchell urges us to fashion a new 
category of implied bias for coworkers of police officers who 
testify as witnesses in a criminal trial, we decline to do so.  
“Prudence dictates that courts” considering an implied bias 
claim “should hesitate before formulating categories of 
relationships [that] bar jurors from serving in certain types of 
trials.”  Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990).  
And our precedent disfavors extending implied bias to cover 
relationships between jurors and Government witnesses.  In 
United States v. Ferri, we held that the occupational 
acquaintance between the husband of a juror and a 
Government witness did not justify a presumption of bias.  
778 F.2d at 993.  Likewise, in Government of Virgin Islands 
v. Gereau, we concluded that a juror who was the ex-wife of a 
non-critical police officer witness, and who interacted with 
him occasionally, was not presumptively excludable.  502 
F.2d at 934.  See also Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 793-
94 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the county coroner who 
retrieved and autopsied the victims in the defendant’s murder 
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trial did not fall within a category of jurors presumed biased 
as a matter of law); United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 
1385, 1390 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding no implied bias even 
though a juror had prior business dealings with key 
Government witnesses); United States v. Brown
 
, 644 F.2d 
101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to impose “a set of 
unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be 
excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special 
relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the 
circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing 
of actual bias or prejudice”).   
We do not agree with our learned dissenting colleague 
that employees of the investigating agency, like employees of 
the prosecuting agency, should be presumptively excluded 
under the implied bias doctrine.  Elimination of any 
distinction between these classes of prospective jurors would 
invite irregularity and confusion in the district courts.  The 
dissent’s proposed category — law enforcement employees 
who share a close working relationship with a law 
enforcement witness — is unrecognized at common law and 
in decisions from this Court, the Supreme Court, or other 
Courts of Appeals.12
                                              
12 Indeed, the dissent does not cite a single case that presumes 
bias in all prospective jurors who work closely with the 
arresting officer called to testify on behalf of the Government. 
  District courts applying this new 
category of implied bias would have no guidance in policing 
the nebulous boundary between an employee who works 
closely with a testifying officer and one who does not.  By 
contrast, the body of case law on the kinship category of 
implied bias, stemming both from the common law and from 
centuries of American constitutional interpretation, sharpens 
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the contours of that category.  It supplies the district court a 
basis for discriminating between jurors who are 
presumptively biased and those who are not. 
 
The dissenting judge is rightly concerned that certain 
relationships between law enforcement witnesses and 
prospective jurors who work with those witnesses are tinged 
by partiality.  We share those concerns.  But we also 
recognize that the implied bias doctrine erects an 
impenetrable barrier.  Were we to enlarge the categories of 
implied bias beyond those accepted at common law and 
hallowed by years of constitutional interpretation, we might 
unwittingly ensnare a larger swath of prospective jurors than 
is necessary to ensure the integrity of the jury trial.  That 
consequence could encumber the selection of jurors in less 
populated areas like the Virgin Islands.  
 
We believe the better approach in this case is to resist 
the temptation to wall off another class of jurors from service 
and to trust in the procedural safeguards built into jury 
selection within the adversarial structure of the trial.  A 
prospective juror who works closely with a testifying police 
officer may, for example, be challenged for cause on the basis 
of actual bias.  The prospective juror is subject to peremptory 
strikes.  The juror may be questioned in a hearing during or 
after trial if doubts regarding his or her impartiality emerge 
during the proceedings.  All of these checks in the system 
exist to protect the defendant’s right to be judged by an 
impartial jury, consistent with the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Under the circumstances, Mitchell’s right to trial by an 
impartial jury was protected adequately by inquiry for actual 
bias, and that inquiry yielded no evidence of actual bias.  The 
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law, we hold, does not categorically impute bias to coworkers 
of key Government witnesses.  The District Court therefore 
properly denied Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97 on an 
implied bias theory.   
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, and 
will remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion on Juror 28’s relationship with the prosecutor. 
 
1 
 
United States of America v. Mitchell, No. 11-2420 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 
I agree with the Majority’s result with respect to the 
question of whether Juror 28 was impliedly biased, and I 
therefore join in holding that we should remand for additional 
factfinding on Juror 28’s degree of kinship with the 
prosecutor.  But because I conclude that, depending on facts 
not available on this record, the average person in Juror 97’s 
position may also pose an inherent risk of bias, and because 
we must resolve doubts regarding bias by not seating the 
affected juror, I would remand for additional factfinding 
concerning the character and frequency of Juror 97’s 
interactions with her police officer co-workers involved in the 
case against Mitchell.  I therefore respectfully dissent in part. 
 
As the Majority explains, the “implied bias [doctrine] 
remains available, in appropriate circumstances, to disqualify 
jurors whose connection with the litigation makes it highly 
unlikely that they can remain impartial adjudicators.”  (Slip 
Op. at 13 (citing United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).)  In dicta in Calabrese, we cited with approval 
Justice O’Connor’s observation in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209 (1982), that a “juror [who] is an actual employee of the 
prosecuting agency” is one example of an “extreme 
situation[] that would justify a finding of implied bias.”1
                                              
1 At common law, a “servant” of a party in a case was 
impliedly biased.  See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
480-81 (W. Hammond ed. 1980) (noting that jurors may face 
a “principal challenge … where the cause assigned carries 
  
 
2 
 
Calabrese, 942 F.2d at 226 (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)); accord United States v. 
Polichemi, 201 F.3d 858, 861-64 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, 
without citing to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith, 
that a juror who was a 15-year secretarial employee in the 
civil division of the prosecuting agency was impliedly 
biased).   
 
It is true, as the Majority says, that Juror 97 is not an 
employee of the prosecuting agency, the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the District of the Virgin Islands.  
Rather, Juror 97 is an employee of the investigative agency, 
the Virgin Islands Police Department.  She knows two of the 
officers who testified against Mitchell because she works 
with them.  The Virgin Islands Police Department was 
responsible for conducting the investigation that led to 
Mitchell’s prosecution and was cooperating with the 
prosecuting agency to convict Mitchell.  In my view, a law 
enforcement agency employee with a close working 
relationship with testifying officers from the same agency has 
at least the same risk of inherent prejudice as has an employee 
of the prosecuting agency.  In fact, because of the closer 
proximity to criminal activity and the often dangerous nature 
of the work done by agencies like the police department here, 
employees of such agencies may more likely be seen as 
impliedly biased against criminal defendants than are 
employees of a prosecuting agency.  Compare Coolidge v. 
                                                                                                     
with it prima facie evident marks of suspicion, either of 
malice or favour … that a juror … is the party’s … servant 
…; which, if true, cannot be overruled, for jurors must be 
omni exceptione majores”). 
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New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), abrogated on 
other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 
(1990) (noting that “the warrant requirement  … is … an 
important working part of our machinery of government, 
operating as a matter of course to check the well-intentioned 
but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers who are part 
of any system of law enforcement” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 
157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that an attorney for a 
prosecuting agency “carries a double burden” and, although 
“he owes an obligation to government … to conduct his case 
zealously,” he also “must be ever cognizant that he is the 
representative of a government dedicated to fairness and 
equal justice to all and … he owes a heavy obligation to [his 
adversary]” (alteration in original) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 
I agree with the Majority that we should not only be 
“concerned … with the right of the defendant to an impartial 
jury” but also “with preservation of the appearance of justice 
in the courts.”  (Slip Op. at 18.)  Indeed, public perception 
matters.  Like the seating of a close relative, the seating of 
someone who goes to work with two of the testifying officers 
could, depending upon the nature of their interaction on the 
job, “lodge serious doubts in the public’s mind about the 
neutrality of the proceedings” which would “favor[] legal 
attribution of bias.”  (Id.)  In my view, the “[p]ublic 
confidence in the fairness of the proceedings would suffer if a 
trial court permitted a juror to deliberate and pass judgment in 
a case in which” certain of her co-workers, with whom she 
might have had a close working relationship, were an integral 
part of “procur[ing] a conviction.”  (Id.) 
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The Majority points out that Mitchell, at oral 
argument, “concede[d] that employment at a police 
department, standing alone, does not justify an implication of 
bias.”  (Id. at 19-20.)  Citing to Dennis v. United States, 339 
U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950), and United States v. Polichemi, 219 
F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000), the Majority suggests that 
Mitchell’s concession is well-founded since the law mandates 
that government employment alone is not enough for a 
finding of implied bias.2  Then, saying that “our precedent 
disfavors extending implied bias to cover relationships 
between jurors and Government witnesses” (Slip Op. at 23),3
                                              
2 The Majority seems to equate employment at an 
investigative agency that is involved in the prosecution with 
employment by a government agency that is in no way 
connected to law enforcement.  As discussed supra, there is a 
sound argument that, in the implied bias context, working for 
a law enforcement agency which is cooperating with the 
prosecuting agency presents a much different situation than 
employment at an agency that is not involved in the 
prosecution.  
 
3 The precedents that the Majority cites to support that 
proposition are United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 
1985), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 
914 (3d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009).  In both of those cases, 
however, the district court during voir dire conducted a 
meaningful inquiry with respect to the nature of the 
relationship at issue.  In Ferri, “the day after the jury had 
been empanelled, the defendants discovered that the husband 
of one juror was a fireman … [and] an issue arose as to 
whether she knew [a] … government witness” who was the 
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the Majority rejects Mitchell’s claim that jurors who are co-
workers of testifying police officers at a criminal trial can be 
impliedly biased.  The Majority concludes that “[t]he law … 
does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key 
Government witnesses.”  (Id. at 25-26.) 
 
 That holding frames Mitchell’s claim too narrowly, by 
ignoring Juror 97’s employer and the role that her employer 
played in securing Mitchell’s conviction.  The Majority fails 
to acknowledge that even the government accepts the premise 
                                                                                                     
fire department captain and “apparently knew the juror’s 
husband.”  778 F.2d at 991.  “[T]he district court conducted 
an additional voir dire examination of the juror,” where the 
juror indicated that she had never heard of the fire department 
captain’s name prior to the trial.  Id. at 992 & n.5.  In Gereau, 
the district court, after learning that a juror was the divorced 
wife of a police officer who was to testify at trial, questioned 
that juror to elicit information regarding the nature of their 
current relationship – that they had been divorced for seven 
years, had a child together that lived with the juror, saw each 
other infrequently and only when it related to the care of that 
child, and that he contributed to child support.  502 F.3d at 
934. 
The level of detail elicited from the respective jurors in 
those two cases stands in stark contrast to the lack of inquiry 
by the District Court here, as discussed infra.  The failure of 
the District Court to conduct additional voir dire with respect 
to Juror 97 left open material questions regarding the contours 
of the working relationship between Juror 97 and the two 
testifying officers that she knew in her employment capacity.  
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that at least some employees of an investigative agency would 
be impliedly biased.  At oral argument, the government 
conceded that a field agent employed by an investigative 
agency could not serve as a juror because that agent would be 
biased as a matter of law. 4
 
  (See Oral Arg. at 25:28, United 
States v. Mitchell (No. 11-2420), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/11-
2420USAv.Mitchell.wma (“[Q:]  Would it have been close 
enough [of a working relationship with the testifying officers 
for a finding of implied bias] if [Juror 97] was riding in the 
squad car with [the testifying officer]?  [A:]  Yes, that would 
be close enough.  [Q:]  Would it be close enough if she 
weren’t riding in the squad car but she was a fellow officer in 
the field and sometimes saw him in the field?  [A:] Yes.  [Q:]  
So would it be close enough if she never saw him in the field 
but she was still a field agent?  [A:]  Yes I believe a field 
agent in this particular matter would be close enough.”).)  The 
government indicated that the test to determine whether a 
juror who is an employee of an investigative agency is 
impliedly biased is whether that employee had a “close 
working relationship” with the testifying officer.  In applying 
its test, because Juror 97 is not an officer in the field but 
rather is an office worker who issues equipment and 
uniforms, the government argued that Juror 97 could not have 
had a “close working relationship” with the officers and 
therefore could not be impliedly biased. 
                                              
4 The Majority’s view thus goes well beyond what 
even the government is willing to claim.  By my colleagues’ 
position, not even a juror who was a testifying officer’s 
partner in a squad car could be held biased as a matter of law.   
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The District Court likewise seemed to recognize that a 
juror could be impliedly biased based on her relationship to 
the agency that collaborated with the prosecuting agency to 
convict Mitchell.  By asking Juror 97 whether she works with 
the testifying officers on a daily basis, the District Court 
appeared attuned to the idea that certain employees of an 
investigative agency can be impliedly biased, depending upon 
the nature of their interactions with co-workers who would be 
testifying officers.  Juror 97, however, did not indicate how 
often or how closely she works with the testifying officers, 
and, unfortunately, the District Court made no attempt to 
obtain that information.  All Juror 97 indicated is that her 
duties include issuing equipment and uniforms to the officers 
and that she does not work in the field.  By allowing her to 
remain on the jury, the District Court, like the government, 
seemed to take the position that the only employees of an 
investigative agency who can be impliedly biased are field 
agents.  Notwithstanding their ultimate position on whether 
Juror 97 may be impliedly biased, both the government and 
the District Court recognized that there is an inherent risk of 
undermining the appearance of justice if certain employees of 
an investigative agency are allowed to sit on a jury.5
                                              
5 That everyone involved in this case except the 
Majority accepts this proposition is telling, particularly since 
the Majority makes a point of observing that I have not 
“cite[d] a single case that presumes bias in all prospective 
jurors who work closely with the arresting officer called to 
testify on behalf of the Government.”  (Slip Op. at 24 n.12.)  
The rejoinder to the “you have no precedent” observation is 
that there is probably no case on point because no one before 
us has ever thought to say that a close work colleague of an 
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Although I agree with the government’s assertion – 
and the implication of the District Court’s line of questioning 
– that we need to examine the parameters of a juror’s working 
relationship with a testifying officer to determine whether that 
juror should be seen as impliedly biased, I do not agree that a 
bright line can rightly be drawn so that only field agents 
employed by the investigative agency satisfy the requisite 
working relationship to be deemed biased as a matter of law.  
Such an approach “fine-tunes matters too far.”  Polichemi, 
201 F.3d at 864 (rejecting government’s argument that juror 
who was a secretary in the civil division of the prosecuting 
agency “should be disqualified [as impliedly biased] only if 
she was under the actual supervision of the officer signing the 
indictment”).  Rather, we should consider the specifics of a 
case in deciding whether bias should be imputed to a juror 
who is an employee of an investigative agency involved in 
the prosecution at hand.  Consideration should be given, for 
example, to the character and frequency of the co-workers’ 
interactions.  Similar to how degrees of consanguinity are 
significant in the “close relative” inquiry, the closer the 
degree of the working relationship between co-workers, the 
more likely it is that an average person in the co-worker’s 
shoes would be prejudiced, despite any claim to the contrary.6
                                                                                                     
investigative and testifying agent could fairly sit on a jury.  It 
is that position which seems to be unprecedented.  
    
6 This type of examination is distinguishable from an 
actual bias inquiry.  In determining actual bias, a court should 
look into a juror’s “state of mind that [would] lead[] to an 
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.”  
United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)).  In 
contrast, the aforementioned considerations would not be 
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The Majority posits that a refusal to accept as jurors 
any “law enforcement employees who share a close working 
relationship with a law enforcement witness” constitutes the 
creation of “a new category of implied bias” which is 
“unrecognized at common law and in decisions from this 
Court, the Supreme Court, or other Courts of Appeals.”  (Slip 
Op. at 24.)  Thus, says the Majority, “[d]istrict courts … 
would have no guidance in policing the nebulous boundary 
between an employee who works closely with a testifying 
officer and one who does not.”7
                                                                                                     
used to determine Juror 97’s personal feelings about the 
particular testifying officers.  Rather, the considerations 
would be used to gather information to make the 
determination of whether Juror 97 is impliedly biased due to 
the nature of the working relationship.  See Skaggs v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 516 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that implied bias is “a question of law proved by facts which 
show [the requisite] connection …” (emphasis added)).   
  (Id.)  As an initial matter, I 
7 The Majority “contrast[s]” this “new category” of 
implied bias with “the body of case law on the kinship 
category of implied bias, stemming both from the common 
law and from centuries of American constitutional 
interpretation,” which “supplies the district court a basis for 
discriminating between jurors who are presumptively biased 
and those who are not.”  (Slip Op. at 24-25.)  Although the 
Majority has not said how “close” a “close relative” needs to 
be for an implied bias finding with respect to Juror 28 – 
instead “leav[ing] it for the District Court to consider, in the 
first instance, the specific contours of the kinship category 
within the context of this case” (id. at 19) – I do not read its 
opinion to adopt the common-law rule of presuming bias to 
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do not believe that I am suggesting anything genuinely new.  
As already discussed, for purposes of the implied bias 
question, an investigative officer can be seen as part of the 
prosecution team.  Cf. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 
1235, 1249 (2012) (noting that a police officer is not 
“automatically entitled to qualified immunity for seeking a 
warrant unsupported by probable cause” on the basis of his 
supervisor’s review of it “because the officers’ superior … 
[was] part of the prosecution team”); Jackson v. Brown, 513 
F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing that, in the 
context of nondisclosure of evidence, “investigative officers 
are part of the prosecution” (citations omitted)); United States 
v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that “[i]n 
considering use of perjured testimony” the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “focus[es] upon the 
‘prosecution team,’ which includes both investigative and 
prosecutorial personnel” (citation omitted)).  Moreover, like 
jurors who are employees of the prosecuting agency, there is 
a significant risk that jurors who are close colleagues of the 
                                                                                                     
“a juror … of kin to either party within the ninth degree,” 3 
William Blackstone, Commentaries 480-81.  If a district court 
were to look to the common law, which would result in a 
finding that a third cousin once removed would be biased as a 
matter of law, “[t]hat consequence” surely would “encumber 
the selection of jurors in less populated areas like the Virgin 
Islands,” much more so than presuming bias in a select group 
of employees at an agency like the police department here.  
(Slip Op. at 25.)  In any event, I am confident that federal 
district judges have the ability to make appropriate 
distinctions “between an employee who works closely with a 
testifying officer and one who does not.”  (Id. at 24) 
11 
 
investigative agents involved in the prosecution would feel 
pressured to convict the defendant because, as Mitchell’s trial 
counsel argued in his motion to remove Juror 97 for cause, 
“anything other than a guilty verdict … would mean that 
[Juror 97] went/voted against her various co-workers and 
their testimony and against the interest of her direct employer 
the Virgin Islands Police Department.”   (App. at 3.)    
 
However, even if recognizing that law enforcement 
employees may be viewed as biased in favor of their work 
colleagues were somehow an innovation in the law, that 
would not undermine the propriety of the innovation.  It is 
hardly dispositive that a “new category” was not recognized 
at common law.  The common law of implied bias, like 
common law generally, develops over time.  See United 
States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Not only 
have the[] common law grounds for causal challenge [based 
on implied bias] retained their vitality, but to them have been 
added others from which prejudice or bias may be implied.” 
(internal citation omitted)); cf. Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 515 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“[T]he 
common law adapts to modern understanding and greater 
experience … .”).   
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en banc in a habeas case, recognized as much 
when fashioning a new category of implied bias in Dyer v. 
Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  Dyer 
involved a defendant whose trial resulted in a murder 
conviction and a death sentence.  Id. at 972.  During voir dire, 
one of the prospective jurors who ended up sitting on the jury 
indicated that none of her close relatives or friends had ever 
been a victim of any type of crime, even though that juror’s 
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brother had been shot and killed approximately six years 
earlier.  Id.  The Dyer court concluded that it should “presume 
bias where a juror lies in order to secure a seat on the jury.”8
 
  
Id. at 983.  It deemed a prior Supreme Court opinion – 
outside of the implied bias context – “instructive because 
Justice Cardozo there equate[d] a juror who lies his way onto 
the jury to a juror who is related to a litigant.”  Id. (citing 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933)).  In so doing, 
the Dyer court understood that it did not matter whether or 
not a prospective juror was part of a recognized category of 
implied bias that had been established by the common law or 
other precedents.  Rather, it recognized that the focus of the 
inquiry should be on whether “it is highly unlikely that an 
individual will remain impartial and objective” even if that 
“putative juror swears up and down that [the bias at issue] 
will not affect his judgment.”  Id. at 982.  To that end, the 
Dyer court listed a number of representative individuals who 
– notwithstanding the fact that some of them fell outside the 
traditional categories of persons thought to be impliedly 
biased – would have been deemed biased as a matter of law in 
Dyer’s trial: 
                                              
8 The Ninth Circuit constructed this new category of 
implied bias less than a decade after its decision in Tinsley v. 
Borg, which the Majority cites for the principle that 
“‘[p]rudence dictates that courts’ considering an implied bias 
claim ‘should hesitate before formulating categories of 
relationships [that] bar jurors from serving in certain types of 
trials.’”  (Slip Op.  at 23 (alteration in original) (quoting 895 
F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990)).)  
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No opinion in the two centuries of the Republic 
– except the dissent in [Dyer] – has suggested 
that a criminal defendant might lawfully be 
convicted by a jury tainted by implied bias.  
Under the dissent’s logic, reasonable jurists 
could hold that Dyer would have been accorded 
due process even if he had been convicted by a 
jury comprised of the following twelve 
individuals: (1) the mother of … the prosecutor, 
(2) [the prosecutor’s] former law partner, (3) 
[the city’s] Chief of Police, (4) the Grand 
Dragon of the … [a]rea KKK, (5) the sister of 
[an individual] who died in the shooting, (6) 
[that victim’s] mother, (7) the victim of Dyer’s 
prior robbery, (8) Dyer’s ex-wife, (9) the 
District Attorney, (10) a[] [city] councilman 
running for re-election on a “tough-on-crime” 
platform, (11) … Dyer’s cellmate, and (12) 
[Dyer’s cellmate’s] wife … – so long as they 
had all sworn they would be fair.  We, on the 
other hand, believe that no reasonable jurist 
would take that position.  Rather, jurists of 
reason would all agree that each of these 
individuals, had they made their way onto the 
jury, should have been struck without stopping 
to inquire into their subjective state of mind. 
Id. at 985 (first emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted).   
 
Although the Majority in the present case is correct 
that no decision is exactly on all fours with the fact scenario 
we are presented with here, see supra note 5, it is also true 
that “[n]o opinion in the two centuries of the Republic … has 
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suggested that a criminal defendant might lawfully be 
convicted by a jury tainted by implied bias,” Dyer, 151 F.3d 
at 985.  In sum, “[m]ore is at stake here than the rights of 
petitioner; justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.  An 
irregularity in the selection of those who will sit in judgment 
casts a very long shadow.”  Id. at 983 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  With respect to Juror 97, I have 
serious doubts whether judicial outsiders would think it fine 
that an arresting officer’s work colleague sat on the jury.9
                                              
9 The doctrine of implied bias “has a counterpart in the 
canons of judicial ethics which require judges to disqualify 
themselves … if they believe that their impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  Dyer, 151 F.3d at 983 n.22.  If a 
judge fails to do so, a party may move to disqualify a judge 
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  When determining whether to 
grant a motion for disqualification pursuant to § 455(a), we 
look to “whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of all 
the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 
F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 2003).  “[T]he hypothetical reasonable 
person under § 455(a) must be someone outside the judicial 
system because judicial insiders … may regard asserted 
conflicts to be more innocuous than an outsider would.”  In re 
Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 303 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In the 
implied bias context, we should likewise be sensitive to the 
fact that a judicial outsider may not regard certain juror bias 
claims as innocuous, even if a judicial insider would.  
  
And, as the Majority notes, “[d]oubts regarding bias must be 
resolved against the juror.”  (Slip Op. at 9 (alteration in 
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).)   
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Whether Juror 97 has the kind of working relationship 
that warrants a conclusion of implied bias is not something I 
would venture to determine on this record, since “[t]he record 
is devoid of information about the nature and regularity of her 
interaction with the officers.”  (Id. at 22.)  Juror 97 “may well 
be objective in fact,” but because yet-to-be-developed facts 
may indicate that “the [working] relationship is so close” that 
the law requires us to “err[] on the side of caution” and 
impute bias, I would have the District Court gather more 
facts.  Polichemi, 219 F.3d at 704.  In particular, I believe it is 
our duty to direct the District Court to dig deeper into the 
character and frequency of the interactions that Juror 97 has 
had with the two testifying officers.  Accordingly, I would 
remand the case for factfinding to determine whether Juror 97 
should be considered biased as a matter of law. 
